Exhibitionist
How Exhibitionist works
How we protect your files
Your case files are stored locked. Each case has its own key. The people on the case hold sealed copies of it, as can a recovery key you choose, and members unlock their copy in their own browser.
Every case has its own lock and key
Each case has its own lock. The parties’ names, documents, page previews, comments, history and finished packets are stored locked.
When you create a case, Exhibitionist makes its key and hands a sealed copy to you. Your password opens your copy, in your browser, on your computer. Your password itself never reaches us. Each person you add to the case gets their own sealed copy.
You can also choose a recovery key in Settings. Each case you create then gives it a sealed copy too, so access can be restored if a member loses theirs. Whoever holds that recovery key, usually someone at your firm, can restore access to those cases and no others. Our servers keep only its public half; Getting back in explains more.
Technical details
Each member has an account keypair (X25519) generated in the browser. The saved account-key envelope wraps the private key using XChaCha20-Poly1305 and a key derived from the password with argon2id13 (64 MiB, 2 operations). The password derives separate sign-in and wrapping secrets; the browser sends only the sign-in secret. Account protocol version 2.
The server generates a case key when the case is created and immediately seals it (x25519-sealed-box) to its creator’s public key and, if the creator chose one, to their recovery public key, which the case then records as its only recovery key (decision 120). During creation, the unsealed key exists only in server memory and is not retained afterwards (decision 102).
Each stored file has its own random data key, wrapped by the case key and bound to that case and the file’s role. Encryption also authenticates the content. A holder of the stored, wrapped account keys could attempt offline password guesses, so password strength matters; the browser enforces a minimum.
Opening a case lends us the key for a short time
To number pages and build your packet, our servers must read the documents. When you open a case, your browser lends our servers that case’s key, and only that one. Your other cases stay locked.
While you work in the case, your browser renews the loan before it runs out, using your key. It does not ask you anything, so collecting documents for hours is never interrupted. Each renewal gives it up to 2 hours more and is recorded in the case history.
The loan lapses after 30 minutes without activity in that case. Typing, clicking and scrolling in the case count, even before you save. Checks the page makes on its own, such as looking for new comments, do not count. Locking the case or signing out ends the loan at once; leaving the page does not. However often it renews, it ends after 2 hours without activity in any of your cases, and at most 12 hours after you first open a case in your session.
When a loan ends, the case locks. Opening it again takes one click, without your password, as long as your browser can still restore your key; otherwise you enter your password once.
While the key is on loan, our servers can read that case. What they produce is stored locked again.
Technical details
The browser opens the member’s sealed copy and reseals the case key to a one-time challenge from the key broker. The broker holds the key in memory under a lease bound to that browser session, with a separate window for each opened case: a random open epoch, a consent deadline and the time of the last member request. Web and worker processes read the case through that window; background jobs receive job-scoped handles that hold no key and read it through that window, bound to its epoch. A job continues across renewals, cannot read while the loan has lapsed, and loses its handle when the case is locked, goes idle or is opened again. Queues never hold a key.
A renewal repeats the challenge with the open epoch. The broker checks the epoch when it issues the challenge and again when it installs the key, so a Lock in any tab wins, and it refuses a renewal once the case has gone 30 minutes without a member request. The page renews only after keyboard, pointer or touch input, and reports keyboard, pointer, touch and wheel input as activity at most once every five minutes, so reading or typing without saving keeps the case open. Requests it makes on a timer are marked as background and refresh nothing: not the case, not the session lease, not the stored key and not the sign-in timeout. The session lease’s limits run from its creation and are enforced by the broker; holding the key in the browser does not extend them (decision 118).
Locking, sign-out or a session timeout revokes the lease. Revocation cannot recall what a running process has already read. Case names in the case list are opened in the browser, so showing the list unlocks nothing on the server, and one click opens one case.
Staying signed in without retyping your password
After you sign in, your browser keeps a locked copy of your key, so refreshing a page or opening a new tab doesn’t ask for your password again. That copy stops working after 2 hours without activity, after 12 hours at most, or as soon as you sign out.
Closing the browser does not sign you out. On a shared computer, sign out when you finish. Anyone who uses your signed-in browser before then could open your cases.
You can also add a passkey in Settings. Then your fingerprint, face or device PIN signs you in and unlocks your key, instead of your password and a code. The passkey works only on this site, and your device checks your fingerprint or face itself; we never see it. Your password and recovery kit keep working. Removing a passkey signs you out everywhere else and locks your open cases.
Technical details
The browser stores the account key in local storage, encrypted with a per-session secret. The key broker holds that secret only in memory, tied to the session, account, credentials and MFA state; neither half opens the key alone. Sign-out, a credential or MFA change, or a broker restart ends it. Sign-in times out after 2 hours without activity by default. If you choose “Keep me signed in”, sign-in can last longer, but the limits above on restoring your key still apply.
Remaining risk: someone holding a copy of the browser profile and a still-valid session cookie can restore the key within those limits (decision 111).
Passkeys are WebAuthn credentials that require user verification. When you add one, the browser asks it for a PRF secret on a fixed input, derives a key from it with HKDF-SHA-256 and a random per-passkey salt, and wraps your account key with XChaCha20-Poly1305, bound to your public key, key generation and that passkey. It opens the wrap again before sending it. Of your key, we store only the wrap. Signing in or unlocking returns that wrap, and only your device can produce the secret that opens it. A passkey sign-in counts as both factors: the device you hold and the fingerprint, face or PIN that unlocks it (decision 119). Every passkey request is single-use and expires after 2 minutes. Adding or removing a passkey needs your password and a new code, or another of your passkeys, within 5 minutes.
Getting back in: three tools, three different jobs
- Sign-in recovery codes
- Prove it’s you when you can’t receive your emailed or texted sign-in code. They let you sign in; they cannot unlock any file. You get 10, each usable once.
- Your recovery kit
- A file you save when you create your account. If you forget your password, it restores access to your key, and so to your cases. Keep it somewhere safe, off your computer. Using it still requires a sign-in code.
- A recovery key
- Optional. You choose it in Settings, usually one your firm shares, and a person you pick keeps its private file. Whoever holds it can give a member back access to the cases that have a copy for it, and no others. We hold it only if you give it to us.
Recovering your account with your kit, or replacing a lost key, removes your passkeys; add them again afterwards. Changing your password keeps them.
If you lose both your password and your kit, a colleague on the case, or the holder of the case’s recovery key if it has one, can restore your access. If every copy of a case’s key is lost, nobody can open that case, including us.
Technical details
Recovery codes are MFA backup codes; only their digests are stored. The recovery kit holds the account recovery secret and is opened locally in the browser to restore the same account key; a reset still needs MFA or an unused recovery code. A recovery key is an X25519 key pair generated in the browser. Its private file is wrapped under a passphrase with the same Argon2id and XChaCha20-Poly1305 construction as the account key, and its holder keeps both; the application stores only public keys. Each case records one recovery key: its creator’s default when it was created, or one a member adds later if it has none. Changing a default affects only new cases, and choosing one needs the same fresh proof as adding a passkey. The holder proves possession in the browser and re-grants access only to existing members of cases that record their key (decision 120). Resetting a password on the server does not restore encryption access. That needs a colleague’s key, your recovery kit or the case’s recovery key.
A sign-in code lasts 15 minutes. New accounts are limited to 5 per IP address in 1 hour; each must verify its saved kit and complete MFA, and starts with access to no existing case.
Templates are not locked the same way
A saved template holds the outline of a filing, not a client’s documents. We can read templates, so they work across cases. Keep client names and details out of them.
Technical details
Personal templates are encrypted with the site’s storage key, which our servers hold, rather than a case key. Saving a case as a template omits exhibit names; the remaining requirement and category text must be reviewed before saving.
What we can see
Our servers cannot read a case while it is locked. They can read it while it is open, because that is how the work gets done.
Whoever holds a recovery key can restore access to the cases that have a copy for it. A new case gets a copy only for the recovery key its creator chose, so we hold none for it unless you give us that key.
Cases created here before recovery keys became each member’s choice also got a copy for one recovery key shared by the whole site. Whoever runs the site chose who holds it; on a shared site it may be us. Those recovery copies have been removed from the current database. The case keys have not changed: someone with the old private recovery key and a database copy from before removal could still open those cases. Giving those cases a new key is not built yet. Each case’s settings show whether this applies to it.
To run the service, we can also see account email addresses, who is on which case, the filing type, page and document counts, and dates. We can read saved templates.
While a case is open, you are trusting the computers that run Exhibitionist. Someone who could change those computers, or the code they send your browser, could see what you open. So we do not claim that nobody but you can ever see your files.
Technical details
While a case is open, web and worker processes handle its plaintext in memory and in temporary files. In the hosted deployment those files use memory-backed storage (tmpfs); swap and core-dump exposure has not been reviewed. Stored results are encrypted again, and previews and downloads stream through authenticated routes. A stolen database, file store or backup holds case content only in encrypted form; its holder could try to guess members’ passwords offline, which is why password strength matters. The session secrets are never written to disk. Exhibitionist makes no zero-knowledge or end-to-end claim against its own running host.
What isn’t finished yet
Removing someone from a case stops them opening it. It cannot take back anything they already downloaded or copied, and changing a case’s key after someone leaves is not built yet.
An independent security review is still to come. Until it and the other open items below are done, Exhibitionist is not ready for confidential client filings.
Open work before real-filing release
- Giving a case a new key: after a member is removed, and for cases that had a copy for the old shared recovery key.
- Customer-authorized packet and storage audits and deleted-case restoration.
- Upgrade of legacy accounts and cases.
- A complete plaintext metadata inventory; tmpfs, swap and core-dump review; performance acceptance; and an independent human security review.
API tokens can add encrypted documents to a locked case. They cannot decrypt cases or produce plaintext exports.